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A Goldilocks Account of Judicial Review? 
By MA.RK TusHNET* 
ACCORDING TO PROFESSOR Christopher Eisgruber, judicial re-
view of the sort embedded in United States constitutional practice is a 
practical mechanism for implementing the Constitution's commit-
ment to self-government.} "The justices ... make a distinctive contri-
bution to representative democracy" because they are "better 
positioned [than elected officials] to represent the people's convic-
tions about what is right."2 Judges can articulate "a conception of jus-
tice with which Americans in general [can] plausibly identify 
themselves. "3 
I will focus here on two themes in Professor Eisgruber's argu-
ment. The first theme can be found in many works of constitutional 
theory-the construction of a strong opposition between the suppos-
edly debased behavior of elected representatives and the supposedly 
more elevated behavior of judges. The differences in behavior are said 
to arise from the differences in incentives on actors in each institu-
tion. Elected representatives pander to get re-elected, while judges 
simply want to be remembered "as having performed their jobs well."4 
In Part I of this Review-Essay, I argue that this opposition is overstated 
in two ways: First, there are indeed policy domains in which represent-
atives do have incentives to pander, such as with respect to "pork bar-
rel" legislation aimed at delivering specific material goods to their 
constituents, but judges have generally refrained from intervening in 
these policy domains. Second, elected representatives have incentives 
to act according to principle, the principles to which a majority of 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
1. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3 (2001). For 
discussions of alternative models of judicial review, see Stephen Gardbaum, The New Com-
monwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMPo L. 707 (2002); Mark Tushnet, Review of 
Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue, U. TORONTO 
LJ. (forthcoming 2002). 
2. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 5. 
3. [d. at 126. 
4. [d. at 58. 
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their constituents may adhere. 5 In short, Professor Eisgruber's de-
fense of judicial review makes most sense precisely in policy domains 
where courts do not operate, and makes least sense in domains where 
they do. 
The second theme emerges from Professor Eisgruber's distinc-
tion between comprehensive rights, which call for "an assessment of 
an entire system of social interaction," and discrete rights that "pre-
scribe[ ] specific forms of government actions."6 Professor Eisgruber 
argues that judges should be cautious about enforcing comprehensive 
rights. Here, I argue in Part II, the underlying concern is with the 
topic that United States constitutional theorists regard as vampires do 
crosses: the possibility of using the Constitution to enforce social wel-
fare rights. But, Professor Eisgruber overlooks the fact that sometimes 
courts enforce traditional rights-against limits on free expression 
and against discrimination-in ways that show that apparently discrete 
rights are indistinguishable from comprehensive ones. If courts can 
enforce these discrete-comprehensive rights, perhaps they can enforce 
social welfare rights as well, particularly when we expand our under-
standing of the possible forms that judicial review can take. 
I. Single-Institution "Comparisons" 
Professor Eisgruber, like most law professors, has a jaundiced 
view of legislators and other officials directly responsible to the peo-
ple. They "pander to voters, campaign for higher office, engineer an 
interest-group deal, or honor a party platform."7 They engage in a 
"shameful pageant of partisan self-interest" when they periodically ap-
portion legislative seats.8 They resolve disputes in ways that lead losers 
5. Professor Eisgruber's analysis is of a type well-criticized in NEIL KOMESAR, IMPER-
FECf ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 22 
(1994) ("It is not sufficient to note the existence of the other institution and the possibility 
that it too may be imperfect or expensive. The crucial question concerns the relative merits 
of the two institutions, when compared to each other."). See, e.g., id. at 92 (asserting that 
"we identified a connection between judicial review and self-government by calling atten-
tion to the inevitable imperfection of electorates, legislatures, and other institutions that 
might claim to speak for the people," without noting that this identification has ignored 
the equally inevitable imperfections of judges who make similar claims). 
6. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 171. 
7. Id. at 4. 
B. See id. at lB. I think it worth noting that the Supreme Court is responsible for a 
fair amount of this partisanship. Its reapportionment decisions actually deny legislators the 
opportunity to act on principled views of how representation schemes serve democratic 
values that differ from the Supreme Court's quite restrictive view. With the opportunity to 
discuss principle taken away from them, legislators play the cards left in the deck after the 
Court threw out the face cards. 
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to believe that the winners wanted "to pad the[ir own] bank ac-
counts."9 Judges, in contrast, "are able to pursue politics in a fashion 
that is principled rather than partisan."10 Judges can "resolve moral 
issues on the basis of the right kind of reasons- reasons of moral 
principle rather than self-interest."11 
This account of incentives and institutions is vulnerable on three 
fronts. It overlooks the possibility that, with respect to the issues of 
most concern to Professor Eisgruber, the differences between elected 
officials and judges are not large enough to justify a strong version of 
judicial review. In addition, it mistakenly underestimates the degree to 
which elected officials in fact act on principle. Professor Eisgruber ac-
knowledges that "elected officials and voters can, and sometimes do, 
treat moral principles seriously,"12 but he does not take that point into 
account in any serious way in his analysis. Finally, Professor Eis-
gruber's account overlooks the limits on the degree to which judges 
are principled. 
Professor Eisgruber's account of the incentives on elected offi-
cials trades on images we all have of legislators enacting pork-barrel 
legislation and making log-rolling trades in which one legislator offers 
her vote on an issue of concern to another legislator in exchange for 
the latter's vote on an issue of concern to the first. Of course vote-
trading happens, and can be described as a process in which elected 
officials try to "pad the bank accounts" of their constituents,13 who 
thereupon reward their representatives by "vot[ing] their pocket-
books."14 This picture of the legislative process is accurate-but only, 
or at least primarily, with respect to a specific set of issues. Appropria-
tion and tax bills are the classic versions of pork-barrel legislation; 
trade legislation, tariff bills, and-again-tax bills are the classic ver-
sions of statutes pervasively affected by vote-trading. 
Of course one could approach tax bills and appropriations stat-
utes with moral principle in mind. Different systems of public assis-
tance to the needy reflect and express different moral judgments 
about social obligations to the needy; the ways in which we tax income 
and capital gains reflect and express moral judgments about the 
moral basis of collective action on various scales of size. So, one might 
9. ld. at 55. 
10. ld. at 4. 
1l. ld. at 55. 
12. ld. at 76. 
13. See id. at 55. 
14. ld. at 60. 
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think, the courts would be well-positioned to counter the crassness of 
the legislative process by considering moral principle as they assess the 
constitutionality of such legislation. 15 
They do not, however. Nor does Professor Eisgruber have much 
to say directly about the proper role of courts in assessing theconstitu-
tionality of what the Supreme Court calls "the area of economics and 
social welfare."lfi Yet, on Professor Eisgruber's account of the institu-
tional differences between courts and elected officials, this is the area 
where judges are pretty clearly substantially superior to elected offi-
cials. At the least, judicial abstention from aggressive review in this 
area poses a puzzle for Professor Eisgruber's descriptive account. 
Indeed, the Court's abstention may pose an even more substan-
tial difficulty, for it suggests that the courts-and Professor Eis-
gruber-may have judicial review exactly backwards. Courts do not do 
much in the area where elected officials are most likely to fit Professor 
Eisgruber's image of such officials. But, they intervene aggressively in 
areas where elected officials are likely either to advance their own con-
sidered moral views-just as, according to Professor Eisgruber, judges 
do-or to pander to voters by acting in accordance with voters' moral 
views rather than the voters' "mere preferences."17 
Why do legislators enact laws restricting the availability of abor-
tions, or statutes prohibiting flag-burning as a means of political pro-
test, or laws regulating the distribution of sexually explicit materials in 
cyberspace, or laws prohibiting human cloning? Obviously, not be-
cause they, or their constituents, hope to "pad the [ir] bank accounts" 
or because they, or their constituents, "fear[ ] loss of income, prop-
erty, or prestige,"18 but because they, or their constituents, think that 
the prohibited practices are bad things. 
15. But see Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 
(1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions in "mere rationality" cases do at least 
articulate a demand that the statutes at issue serve some public interest). 
16. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The index contains no entries 
for Dandridge, the related case of Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), social welfare 
rights, public assistance, or welfare. The entries under Taxation do not address the issue 
discussed here. For a discussion of the way in which Professor Eisgruber indirectly ad-
dresses the judicial role in enforcing social welfare rights,. see infra text accompanying 
notes 57-63. 
17. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 55. 
18. [d. at 60. One could develop a fancy account of how people who oppose flag-
burning lose prestige when flag-burning occurs (an account that would have to distinguish 
between such a loss of prestige and the loss that occurs when the legislature adopts a 
program of public assistance different from the one favored by people who might be said 
to lose prestige upon its enactment), but I doubt that Professor Eisgruber had such an 
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According to Professor Eisgruber, "[e]ven if politicians and 
judges are equally moral and equally insightful, it is easier for judges 
to act on their moral convictions" and "to exercise their judgment 
untainted by avarice or personal ambition."19 I think we can put ava-
rice aside in considering the purported advantages judges have over 
elected officials in assessing the moral significance of laws against flag-
burning or restricting the availability of abortions. 
In assessing the relative advantage of judges over elected officials, 
we should consider elected officials who act on their own judgments 
about what morality requires, or who respond to their perception of 
what a majority of their constituents believe to be required by, or con-
sistent with, moral principle. On matters raising questions of moral 
principle, elected officials' incentives are more complicated than "ava-
rice" or "padding bank accounts." Indeed, among their incentives is 
the desire, shared with judges as Professor Eisgruber describes judges, 
to be remembered "as having performed their jobs well," where, once 
again, the elected officials' understanding of the nature of their jobs 
goes well beyond simply bringing home the bacon for their 
constituents.2o 
An elected official might be in a position to act on her own judg-
ment for a number of reasons. The official might have been so good 
at delivering the pork that her constituents cut her some slack on 
some issues implicating moral principle.21 Or, the constituents might 
think that the elected official has a kind of experience they lack on 
matters of moral significance, and defer somewhat to her judgment. 
Or, finally, the constituents may place positive value on having a rep-
resentative who "thinks independently"-not merely independently of 
party officials, but of the constituents themselves. 
What, though, of the elected official who "panders" to the moral 
judgments of her constituents? I doubt that it is helpful to deprecate 
her action as reflecting simple "personal ambition." Suppose a politi-
cian interested in re-election or in seeking higher office calculates 
that acting in accordance with the considered moral views of her pre-
account in mind in contrasting legislators who have such a fear and judges who do not. He 
certainly does not develop such an account in his book. 
19. Id. at 58. 
20. I assert this as a fact. For some support in the political science literature, see, e.g., 
RICHARD F. FENNO, HOME S"IYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS (1978). 
21. Although, of course, an elected official who is good at delivering the pork cannot 
get too far out of line with her constituents' views on issues of moral principle, because the 
constituents will, at some point, conclude that the official has traded too much principle 
for too little pork. 
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sent or prospective constituents will advance her ambitions. The poli-
tician supports flag-burning legislation not because she believes it 
justified by the best moral theory-assume that she actually has no 
considered views on that question22-but because her constituents do. 
The mere fact that the official is motivated by personal ambition does 
not seem to me to demonstrate that judges have an advantage. True, 
the elected official might not be resolving a moral issue directly "on the 
basis of the right kind of reasons-reasons of moral principle rather 
than self-interest,"23 but she is invoking the right kinds of reasons indi-
rectly, because her self-interest lies in resolving the moral issue on the 
basis of the moral reasons held by her constituents. 
Professor Eisgruber does not devote much attention to voters 
whose support for a politician turns on their moral judgments, per-
haps because he has constructed a dichotomy in which voters act only 
on the basis of material self-interest. But, perhaps his concern is that 
voters who act on moral judgments do not act on the right kind of 
moral judgments. Voters have moral views, of course, but perhaps 
their moral judgments are imperfect-or, more precisely, are more 
imperfect than judges' moral judgments. I would suppose that the 
idea here would be that voters' moral judgments are insufficiently re-
flective: A seven-second television spot ad shows someone burning a 
flag or shows a child at a library apparently accessing pornography on 
the Internet or a modern Dr. Frankenstein cloning a human being, 
and voters simply want to stop that stuff without considering whether 
considerations of free expression or other moral considerations out-
weigh whatever moral judgments lie behind their dislike. Judges, in 
contrast, have the advantage of deciding cases deliberately, that is, 
with deliberation about all the relevant moral considerations. 
I believe there are two difficulties with this line of argument.24 
First, it overlooks two possibilities arising from the nature of represen-
22. Different issues would arise, going to role morality rather than constitutional the-
ory, were the legislator to think the proposal incompatible with her considered views on 
whether the statute is justified. 
23. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 55. 
24. I admit to some diffidence in pursuing this line of argument, because Professor 
Eisgruber asserts that he is offering a new way of explaining and defending judicial review, 
and the argument that judges are more deliberative than either voters or elected officials is 
old. For example, Alexander Bickel referred to the judicial advantage in "hav[ingl the 
leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar." ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LFAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25 
(1962). But I do not know what other line of argument Professor Eisgruber might develop 
in response to the observation that elected officials, sometimes independently and some-
times derivatively, act on their or their constituents' moral judgments. 
HeinOnline -- 37 U.S.F. L. Rev.  69 2002-2003
Fall 2002] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 69 
tative democracy. Madison's optimistic observation that deliberation 
among elected representatives might "refine and enlarge the public 
views"25 reflects one of these possibilities: Elected representatives 
might, for reasons I have sketched, be in a position to deliberate in 
roughly the same way that judges do. 
The other possibility for deliberation among the public is a bit 
less optimistic. Suppose that a great many elected officials simply par-
rot the unreflective moral judgments of their constituents, but that 
some elected officials have room to act on their own moral judgments. 
Sometimes the latter group of officials may be in a position to control 
the legislative outcome. Once again, in such instances I would not be 
confident in asserting that judges had an advantage over the legisla-
tive process taken as a whole if the judges asserted that a statute was 
inconsistent with fundamental moral principle (or with those funda-
mental moral principles that characterize the American people). 
The second difficulty with the claim that public views on moral 
questions are insufficiently deliberative or considered is that it over-
looks the fact that moral questions are often quite hard. I personally 
am quite convinced that laws restricting flag-burning as a method of 
political protest are incompatible with basic American principles of 
free expression, the adjective here signaling that my judgment rests in 
part on an account of American nationhood and therefore is compati-
ble with, and perhaps even mandated by, patriotism properly under-
stood. I acknowledge, though, that there are accounts of patriotism 
different from mine, according to which failing to prohibit flag-burn-
ing as a means of political protest is incompatible with patriotism 
properly understood.26 More generally, what to one person looks like 
an ill-considered moral judgment that would be altered under ideal 
conditions-after deliberation, or with campaign advertising re-
stricted -is to the person who has made that judgment, as fully con-
sidered a judgment as there can be. 
In the domain where the Supreme Court mostly operates, much 
of the disagreement between contending sides is straight-forward, dif-
ficult moral disagreement. I think it clearly insufficient to dismiss the 
moral judgments made by voters or their representatives as motivated 
by avarice or self-interest in a disparaging sense. If Professor Eis-
gruber's underlying view is that voters' moral judgments are not fully 
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 GAMES MADISON). 
26. See, e.g., Richard D. Parker, Homeland: An l!.Ssay on Patriotism, 25 HARv. J. L. & PUB. 
POL'y 407 (2002). 
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considered, I think we deserve a more substantial argument for that 
conclusion than he offers. 
Professor Eisgruber provides a brief case study of the response by 
public officials to deep moral questions in his discussion of the Cruzan 
case. Professor Eisgruber is plainly exercised by the case, asserting that 
"one might well regard it as abominable for politicians to mess with 
the lives of severely ill patients for the benefit of their own careers or 
causes."27 The case involved an effort by the family of Nancy Cruzan, a 
woman in a coma from which she was apparently unlikely ever to 
emerge, to obtain legal permission to terminate the "life"-sustaining 
treatment she was receiving.28 Here is the analysis Professor Eisgruber 
provides in the text of actions of the state's elected officials: 
[T]he Missouri attorney general may have been more interested in 
advancing his political agenda than in protecting Nancy Cruzan's 
interests. By taking the position that human life is always sacred, 
the attorney general scored points with Missouri's powerful anti-
abortion lobby. Indeed, there is one piece of evidence which 
strongly suggests that Missouri's attorney general was using Nancy 
Cruzan as a political symbol: after winning the Cruzan case, the at-
torney general withdrew from later trial court proceedings. Mis-
souri thereby enable Cruzan's family to disconnect her from the 
machines that were prolonging her existence. If Missouri really 
cared about Nancy Cruzan's life, why would its attorney general 
permit her medical treatment to end after her legal battle left the 
public limelight?29 
Material in Professor Eisgruber's endnotes supplements the story. 
Professor Eisgruber quotes a lawyer appointed to represent Nancy 
Cruzan's interests as asserting that the attorney general "withdrew 
from the case for strategic, partisan reasons," and notes the attorney 
general's denial of the allegation.30 The endnote continues, "[a]lmost 
immediately after Cruzan's death, ... [the attorney general] began 
waging a new battle in an almost identical case," which later "became 
27. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 59. One signal of the difficulty with Professor Eis-
gruber's position is his apparent belief that acting out of concern for "careers" and for 
"causes" are equally disreputable. Professor Eisgruber appears to believe, though with no 
apparent basis, that a person who seeks to advance a cause is necessarily insensitive to 
competing considerations. See infra note 53. But, I would have thought, one could advance 
a cause after taking all the relevant considerations into account and concluding that, in the 
circumstances, advancing the cause is morally preferable to any other course. 
28. I put life in scare-quotes to indicate that one characterization of the issue in Cruzan 
is whether she was in fact still alive in a morally meaningful sense. 
29. [d. at 58-59. 
30. [d. at 224 n.3l. 
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a campaign issue," with the winning candidate "promising to let [the 
woman's] family decide her fate."31 
This is a very rich text. Professor Eisgruber moves from a tentative 
"may have" in his opening, to an assertion, qualified by a "might well 
regard it," that the politician's behavior was "abominable." The attor-
ney general is said to have scored points with a powerful lobby. But, 
notice that the "lobby" consists of people who believe that abortion is 
immoral. So, on the most disparaging characterization of the attorney 
general's action, he was responding to the deeply held moral views of 
a substantial number of his constituents. And, against the claim that 
he acted in narrowly strategic way, there is the endnote's observation 
that the attorney general pursued "an almost identical case" after 
Cruzan's resolution.32 
In short, there is almost nothing to support the assertion that the 
Cruzan litigation demonstrates how politicians motivated by narrow 
self-interest and not by moral principle end up messing with people's 
lives. But, even more remarkably, there is nothing whatever in the 
Cruzan litigation to show that judges are better at responding to moral 
principle than politicians. For, after all, Missouri won the case. That is, 
the judges-"disinterested," in Professor Eisgruber's term,33 unlike 
the mean-spirited politicians out to win votes-agreed with Missouri's 
attorney general. Of course this might only show that in Cruzan, the 
moral judgments made by disinterested judges converged by happen-
stance with decisions driven by political calculations of careerist politi-
cians. Still, one might well regard the Cruzan case as an illustration of 
the proposition that disinterested judges can mess with people's lives 
at least as much as politicians can-or, perhaps, that what we are ob-
31. Id. 
32. The claim that the attorney general was simply messing with Cruzan's life is said to 
be supported by his withdrawal from the case after the Supreme Court decided that the 
family could prevail only if they showed by clear and convincing evidence that Nancy 
Cruzan would have wished to die had she known what her circumstances would be. With-
drawing was inconsistent with the position, said to have been taken by the state's attorney 
general, that "human life is always sacred." But, the attorney general's position in the Su-
preme Court was not that human life was always sacred. At that stage all parties agreed that 
no legal obstacle prevented Nancy Cruzan from deciding to terminate her treatment. The 
family contended that, with Nancy unable to state her preference, the family's assertions 
about her preferences had to be accepted, whereas the state contended that a court had to 
determine to its satisfaction what her preferences were (or would have been). Having es-
tablished that the Constitution did not require the state to take the family's assertions as 
conclusive, the attorney general need not have been concerned with whether the family 
could satisfy the evidentiary requirements of Missouri law. 
33. See id. at 59. 
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serving is sincere disagreement between and among politicians and 
judges about what moral principle requires. 
Professor Eisgruber knows that many public issues are resolved 
on the basis of direct moral judgments by voters and their representa-
tives, but overlooks the importance of that point. In one of his discus-
sions of the abortion issue, Professor Eisgruber responds to critics who 
have argued not that it denied the electorate the power to enact its 
considered moral judgments but rather that the Court's decision trun-
cated public and legislative discussions, foreclosing "the ability to ne-
gotiate pragmatic solutions."34 Professor Eisgruber replies that the 
Supreme Court probably could not have done much to defuse the 
"volatile" abortion issue.35 The critics Professor Eisgruber addresses 
hope that "absent Court intervention, the legislature would be better 
able to negotiate a compromise among the bitterly divided factions 
that inevitably exist within American society."36 But, Professor Eis-
gruber observes, "what reason do we have to think that legislative log-
rolling would be a good way to address moral divisions within soci-
ety?"37 He continues, 
The best we can hope is that American institutions will sponsor an 
articulate and thoughtful inquiry into the diverse opinions held by 
the American people, and that, over time, people will move in the 
right direction. As we have seen, the disinterestedness of Supreme 
Court justices enhances the likelihood both that they will engage in 
such an inquiry and that they will inspire American citizens to do 
likewise.38 
I find this defense of judicial review quite puzzling. First, and 
most obvious, opponents of abortion are hardly in favor of legislative 
log-rolling; they have firmly held moral views that they would like to 
enact into law.39 Their problem is that the Supreme Court will not let 
them. A second-best solution for them is legislative log-rolling, but 
that solution is entirely derivative of the Supreme Court's position. A 
defender of the Supreme Court can hardly criticize the legislature for 
34. [d. at 99. 
35. See id. at 100. 
36. [d. at 10l. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 101-02. 
39. Some of the critics Professor Eisgruber addresses are actually supporters of abor-
tion rights, dismayed that the Supreme Court's decisions appear to have had adverse long-
term consequences for the stable resolution of the abortion controversy in favor of rela-
tively unrestricted access to abortion. 
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engaging in log-rolling when that practice would not occur in the ab-
sence of judicial review.40 
Second, and related, the Court might "sponsor an articulate and 
thoughtful inquiry" into the moral basis of widespread public views, 
but the people who engage in that inquiry are rather like Glendower: 
They, like him, can call the spirits from the vastly deep, but the Su-
preme Court will not let the spirits answer.41 Early in the book Profes-
sor Eisgruber notes that judges have a "democratic pedigree,"42 being 
selected by the elected branches. So, perhaps the product of the "ar-
ticulate and thoughtful inquiry" into some question of moral sub-
stance is not a resolution of the question directly, but is instead the 
selection of judges who indirectly offer the people the answer the peo-
ple like. Here, though, two problems arise: The interim costs before 
the courts' composition changes-the millions of babies killed, as pro-
ponents of restrictive abortion laws would have it-can be quite high. 
And, the courts' composition might change too slowly, in the sense 
that the people might have arrived at a well-considered judgment on 
the merits of the question some years before enough judges retire or 
die to change the courts' composition in the right direction. 
It would be tedious to go through the liberal and conservative 
individual rights agendas to demonstrate, as I think I could, that 
mostly, what is going on is the sort of sincere disagreement reflected 
in Cruzan and the abortion controversy: On the conservative side, 
claims that hate speech legislation, campaign finance laws, and affirm-
ative action programs are unconstitutional; on the liberal side, claims 
that sexually explicit material should be available with little restric-
tion, that flag-burning cannot be prohibited, that abortions should be 
available to those who want them-these claims attack statutes justi-
fied by different moral judgments than those reached by the statutes' 
challengers. Of course one can conjure up accounts of how affirma-
tive action programs, hate speech legislation, restrictive abortion laws, 
anti-pornography laws, and everything else that legislatures do result 
from squalid interest group deals that pad people's pocketbooks. 
Such accounts, however, would implausibly discount the evident 
40. See also supra note 8 (noting the impact the Supreme Court's reapportionment 
decisions have had on legislative behavior). 
41. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act 3, sc. 1 
("Glendower: I can call spirits from the vast deep. Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any 
man; But will they come when you do call for them?"). 
42. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 64. 
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moral motivations at work in the electoral and legislative processes.43 
To the extent that voters and elected officials do act on moral princi-
ple, Professor Eisgruber's case for judges is at best overstated. 
So far my comments have focused primarily on the role moral 
principle plays in the actions of elected officials. What of judges? The 
Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan ~uggests caution if one thinks that 
the elected officials behaved badly there. Professor Eisgruber acknowl-
edges that the incentives inducing judges to act in a principled way 
can "misfire," as when" m udges ... may feel geep attachments to a 
political party, or to their social class, or to the legal profession, or to 
some ideological platform."44 I think it a bit off to say that the behav-
ior induced by these attachments results from the misfiring of other 
incentives. Professor Eisgruber argues that judges are able to respond 
to principled arguments precisely because they are free of the pres-
sures toward crassness that the need to be elected and re-elected cre-
ates. That freedom, though, is also what gives judges the ability to 
respond to the "deep attachments" they feel. In a world of freedom, 
that is,judges can be principled, but they also can be less principled as 
well. Judicial attachment to principle, then, is actually a matter of 
degree. 
I have no doubt that judges· ().nd elected officials are located at 
different positions on the continuum of motivations between the prin-
cipled and the crass. Or, more accurately, they are located at different 
positions on the numerous continua in various policy domains. Profes-
sor Eisgruber does not really examine where they are located in any 
specific domain. Judges and elected officials may well be rather closer 
to each other on some overall continuum than Professor Eisgruber's 
rhetoric suggests. The case for a strong version of judicial review is 
weakened the smaller the distance is. In addition, as I have argued, 
judges and elected officials might well be quite far apart on the con-
tinuum in some policy domain (the domain of economic policy, for 
example) but quite close on the continuum in some other domain 
(the domain of constitutional privacy, for example). The case for a 
strong version of judicial review is best where judges and elected offi-
cials are farthest apart. But, it seems to me, existing constitutional doc-
43. For a similarly cautionary obseIVation about ovemsing positive political theory ac-
counts of the legislative process, see Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the 
Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE LJ. 1707, 
1729-30 (2002) (warning against "the embrace of a universal formal theory of congres-
sional action"). 
44. EISGRUBER, infra note 1, at 63-64. For more on the obseIVation about ideological 
platforms, see infra note 5. 
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trine gets the matter backwards: Judges do not intervene when the 
chances that elected officials are pandering are greater, and do inter-
vene when there is a decent case for the view that elected officials are 
simply acting on views of principle that simply differ from the judges' 
views. 
Professor Eisgruber offers a pragmatic assessment of the Supreme 
Court's performance. He concludes, "Though virtually everybody is 
upset about one case or another, few observers look at the Court's 
track record and claim, with the benefit of hindsight, that the United 
States would have been better off during the last fifty years without judi-
cial review."45 Professor Eisgruber's list of the Supreme Court's "great-
est moments" is Brown v. Board of Education,46 the reapportionment 
cases, the Pentagon Papers case, and United States v. Nixon.47 This, it 
seems to me, is simple academic gerrymandering.48 It omits the abor-
tion cases, the affirmative action cases, the racial redistricting cases, 
and the Court's grudging interpretation of Congress's power under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment-all, I note, more recent 
than the cases, other than Nixon, that Professor Eisgruber praises. Nor 
does Professor Eisgruber's evaluation, offered as supporting a judg-
ment about the comparative contributions to how well off the United 
States has been of judges and elected officials, seriously take into ac-
count the extent to which the past fifty years have been shaped by civil 
rights statutes, broadly understood to include enactments like the 
Americans With Disabilities Act. Legislatures have done some good, 
after all. I have no idea what the "on balance, all things considered" 
pragmatic judgment should be. I do know that Professor Eisgruber 
45. [d. at 73 (emphasis added). 
46. The repeated citation of Brown against critics of judicial review seems to me a 
trope worth both comment and abandonment. See Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 
483 (1954). In another context, Harold Koh identified a similar (partisan) invocation of a 
case as the '''Cuniss-Wright, so I'm right' cite." HAROLD HONG-JU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECUR-
IlY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990). 
47. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 73. 
48. Defending the abortion cases against the criticism that they distorted public de-
bate, Professor Eisgruber notes that the abortion issue raised a host of cultural, political, 
and constitutional questions, and says that "it seems likely that the abortion issue was des-
tined to ignite one way or another." [d. at 100. A cynic might say that Professor Eisgruber's 
gerrymandering is this: When someone says that the Supreme Court made the nation 
worse off, Professor Eisgruber replies that things would have gone wrong anyway; when 
someone says that the nation would have gotten better by the acts of elected officials and 
voters, Professor Eisgruber replies that, as things actually happened, the Supreme Court 
made a positive contribution. I doubt that he can have it both ways: One must be 
counterfactual in both cases, or factual in both. 
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does not come close to providing a serious case to support his confi-
dent assertion that the Court made the United States better off. 49 
II. Discrete Rights, Judicial Capacity, and Social Welfare 
Rights 
For Professor Eisgruber, judges must "act on the basis of a con-
ception of justice with which Americans in general could plausibly 
identify themselves."5o And, as we have seen, he wants judges to articu-
late legal rules that express moral principles that, in turn, would in-
duce the people to "move in the right direction."51 At this point the 
specter that haunts liberal constitutional theory appears. For, on any 
plausible account of political morality, a society's distribution of mate-
rial goods is a proper subject of moral evaluatio·n. So, if courts are "to 
speak on behalf of the people about questions of moral and political 
principle,"52 it would seem that courts should develop a constitutional 
jurisprudence of social welfare rights. Social democracy offers the 
kind of conception of social justice with which Americans could iden-
tify themselves. The social democratic tradition can be located in the 
Populist movement of the late nineteenth century, it found expres-
sion in some aspects of the Progressive agenda early in the twentieth, 
and it provided important support for the social welfare programs of 
the New Deal and the later War on Poverty. Exemplary figures in that 
tradition are Eugene V. Debs, Dorothy Day, and Michael 
Harrington.53 
49. For an extremely careful discussion of what we would need to know to make such 
a judgment, see Wojciech Sadurski, judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights, 
22 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 275 (2002). I think the emerging judgment among liberals is 
more that, from 1954 (Brown) to sometime in the 1970s or early 1980s, the United States 
was better off for having judicial review, and that for more recent years the "on balance" 
judgment is enormously complex and might well come out against judicial review. Those 
conclusions, though, cannot arise from the kind of incentive-based analysis Professor Eis-
gruber offers, because the structural incentives on which he relies have not substantially 
changed over, say, the last century. (Or, at least, some more complete analysis of the 
changes in incentives-on elected officials and on judges-would be needed to support 
the conclusion.) 
50. EISGRUBER, supra note I, at 126. 
51. [d. at 101. 
52. [d. at 3. 
53. I admit to a personal interest here. I have already quoted Professor Eisgruber's 
observation that judges "may feel deep attachments to ... some ideological platform." [d. 
at 100. The end-note he attaches to that observation describes as "shocking" a comment I 
made two decades ago, that were I ajudge I would decide cases with an eye to results that 
would "advance the cause of socialism." [d. at 225 n.39. My position is "shocking," accord-
ing to Professor Eisgruber, because it "smacks of ideological partisanship: a man dedicated 
to a cause sounds like one who has little inclination to consider new arguments and little 
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Why avoid the articulation of a social democratic theory of judi-
cially enforceable social welfare rights? The answer to that question is 
easy: Liberal constitutional scholars fear that that way lies Lochner-
that is, judicial enforcement of a conservative or libertarian economic 
account of social welfare rights.54 Another question is harder: How to 
avoid articulating such a theory, given a willingness to articulate a the-
ory of judicially enforceable rights of privacy and free expression? Pro-
fessor Eisgruber uses a distinction between comprehensive moral 
principles, such as those dealing with distributive justice, and discrete 
ones, such as those dealing with privacy and free expression, to block 
the move in the direction of constitutionalized social welfare rights. 
Professor Eisgruber develops this distinction out of his reflection 
on the fact that a court whose remit was limited to "matters of pure 
principle" would "do virtually nothing."55 Translating moral principles 
into "legal rules with bite" requires judges to go beyond the principles 
themselves, and to develop supplements that allow the principles to 
which the judges respond to be enforced as law.56 This task requires, 
in turn, that judges exercise strategic judgment in designing the legal 
rules. The distinction between discrete and comprehensive principles 
is a strategic one arising from the limits on judicial competence. 
Professor Eisgruber introduces the distinction in his discussion of 
Lochner v. New York.57 For Professor Eisgruber, one version of the 
patience with anything that stands in the way of his program." Id. Consider other aspects of 
the American tradition: Is a judge who acts to advance the cause of liberal democracy an 
ideological partisan, with little inclination to consider new arguments and impatient with 
obstacles? A judge who acts to advance the cause of libertarianism? What must exercise 
Professor Eisgruber, I think, is either a narrow understanding of what it means to advance 
a cause, or that a constitutional program for social democracy would require courts to 
enforce comprehensive rights, whereas courts acting on a centrist liberal conception of 
justice need only enforce discrete rights. 
I should note two additional points'. First, to the extent that I remain committed to a 
constitutional program for social democracy, it most decidedly does not include vigorous 
judicial review. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999) (arguing strenuously against the form of judicial review Professor Eisgruber de-
fends). Second, my assertion about pursuing social democracy as a judge was followed 
immediately by the observation that the very fact that I held that view meant that I would 
not become one, a point consistent with Professor Eisgruber's observation that the manner 
in which judges are selected ensures that judges "are unlikely to be moral radicals." EI5-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 65. 
54. I note that liberals may lack confidence in their judgment that the social welfare 
state is justified by the best moral and political theory. If that is why they fear Lochner-that 
is, they fear that Richard Epstein might be right about property rights-I wonder, what are 
the sources of their confidence in their judgments about constitutional privacy. 
55. Id. at 136. 
56. Id. 
57. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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moral principle underlying Lochner is attractive. 58 But, he argues, "the 
inevitable generality of claims related to social welfare ... renders 
economic rights an inhospitable domain for judicial intervention .... 
Laws and transactions make a web of economic relationships, and it is 
that web as a whole, rather than particular nodes within it, that seems 
the appropriate target of moral scrutiny."59 Claims about social wel-
fare rights, that is, are comprehensive in "call[ing] for assessment of 
an entire system of social interaction."60 In contrast, "other aspects of 
human liberty," such as free speech and personal autonomy, implicate 
"discrete parts of government practice,"61 stating "particularized side-
constraints upon governance."62 Professor Eisgruber uses this distinc-
tion to examine and criticize the Supreme Court's decisions about 
government structures such as separation of powers and federalism. 
But, as he says, the distinction is different from the more traditional 
distinction between structure and rights: "Some side constraints se-
cure individual liberties, but others describe structural restrictions 
upon government action."63 In particular, "liberal constitutional 
claims about a minimum standard of welfare" implicate comprehen-
sive rights,"64 and it is on these on which this Section focuses. 
The distinction between discrete and comprehensive rights is 
overdrawn, however. Many apparently simple cases involving what 
seem to be mere side-constraints on governance actually implicate 
"entire system [s] of social interaction," and can be justified only by 
evaluating the systems as a whole. I give some examples next, but it is 
important to keep in mind the aim of the argument-to undermine 
the claim that courts are reasonably good at enforcing discrete princi-
ples and probably bad at enforcing comprehensive ones by showing 
that courts actually enforce comprehensive principles in some rela-
tively uncontroversial cases, and thereby to support indirectly the 
claim that courts can enforce social welfare rights as competently as 
they enforce these "discrete" principles. 
Consider first the constitutional law of libel. As Professor Eis-
gruber argues, for strategic reasons the Supreme Court has created "a 
58. See id. at 164-65 (asserting that Professor Eisgruber finds attractive the principle 
that, "[i]n a fair and well-functioning marketplace, people should be free to enter into 
contracts that enable them to improve their life by working harder and longer"). 
59. [d. at 165. 
60. [d. at 171. 
61. [d. at 165. 
62. [d. at 170. 
63. [d. at 171. 
64. [d. at 166. 
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broad safe harbor" that immunizes commercial enterprises for mak-
ing false statements about public figures unless the plaintiff shows that 
the false statements were made with actual malice.65 The Court's rule 
"rest[s] upon a pragmatic judgment-such as a concern that juries 
will reach the wrong outcome, or that responsible speakers will be 
silenced because it is expensive to defend against meritless suits."66 
What are the costs and benefits of the Court's rule?67 People suffer 
real damage to their reputations, 'of the sort for which monetary com-
pensation is the ordinary remedy, but are unable to obtain compensa-
tion.68 Commercial enterprises-newspapers, magazines, and 
broadcasters-make money off the stories they publish. The public 
benefits from the wider availability of information that occurs under 
the Court's rule than would occur under alternative rules. In short, 
some people are forced to subsidize media enterprises so that the 
public can benefit. In libel law; the Constitution does not operate sim-
ply as a side-constraint on governance; the Constitution mandates a 
distribution of wealth for the public good. The justification of the 
Court's rule must be that this distribution of wealth is better than the 
distribution that would occur under any alternative judicially enforce-
able rule. That looks to me like an "assessment of an entire system of 
social interaction," that is, th~ invocation of a comprehensive 
principle.69 
Nor is the structure of libel law unusual in the law of free expres-
sion, which is pervaded by requirements that someone-usually the 
public-subsidize someone else, with the effect of denying the public 
the opportunity to use its resources' for other ends such as assistance 
to the needy.70 The point is easiest to see in a hypothetical case that, 
as far as I know, has not yet arisen, but about which most people's 
intuitions are quite clear. Begin with a wealthy candidate for public 
65. See id. at 137. 
66. [d. at 138. 
67. The analysis that follows tracks Frederick Schauer; Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 
COLUM. L. REv. 1321 (1992). 
68. One could be skeptical about whether damage to reputation actually occurs, but a 
broad constitutional immunity is necessary only if (a) monetary awards would otherwise be 
forthcoming, (b) some of those awards would not accurately measure the real harm to 
reputation, and (c) ordinary methods of trial-level and appellate control over jury awards 
could not be counted on to reduce the rate of error to an acceptable level. 
69. I do not know how various principles of wealth distribution would resolve the 
question of who, as between public figures and media enterprises, deserves the wealth 
accruing to reputation, but that is the question constitutional libel law poses. 
70. Libel law is unusual only because the subsidy flows from one private party, the 
public figure, to another, the media enterprise, rather than from the public to some pri-
vate party. 
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office who wants to use a public park for a rally of her supporters. The 
rally will impose some costs on the city beyond the usual costs associ-
ated with running a public park: some extra police will have to be 
assigned, and there will be more trash to clean up after the rally than 
there would be after an ordinary day. The city tells the candidate that 
she can have a permit to use the park for the rally only if she pays the 
excess costs attributable to the rally. Does the Constitution preclude 
the city from charging this fee?71 If the city can charge the fee for 
excess costs to the wealthy candidate, can it charge a cost justified fee 
to impecunious candidates, who cannot afford to pay? My sense is that 
people divide over the first question, but agree that the answer to the 
second is, "No, the city cannot charge a cost justified fee to a political 
candidate who cannot afford to pay." If that is right, and I think it is, 
the First Amendment requires public subsidies for at least some politi-
cal activities. But, of course, the money that has to be used to subsidize 
political activity could be used for other public purposes. Once again, 
then, the First Amendment creates a system of social interactions and 
is not a simple side-constraint. 
The question of the cost justified fee for a permit may seem eso-
teric, but its structure is the same as the basic question of public fo-
rums. That question is, "Maya city refuse to make its streets or parks 
available for political demonstrations?" The answer, going back to 
Hag;ue v. G.I.O.72 and unquestioned since then, is that an absolute ban 
on the use of streets and parks for demonstrations is unconstitutional. 
These areas must be made available subject only to reasonable time 
and manner restrictions: A city can insist that a protest march avoid 
the city's major commuter routes during rush hour, but it cannot bar 
demonstrators from using that street, or one that provides the demon-
strators with access to a roughly equivalent audience, after the rush 
hour has passed. A demonstration in the late morning will disrupt 
some traffic, but the cost of that disruption is one that the Constitu-
tion requires the city to bear. Or, more accurately, requires people in 
the city to bear: Some packages will not be delivered on time, some 
people will arrive late at meetings or miss them entirely, and so on. 
Again the First Amendment requires some people to subsidize others, 
and subsidy questions are questions about entire systems of social 
arrangements. 
71. See Forsyth County, Georgia v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) 
(invalidating a fee requirement where there was no mechanism in place to ensure that the 
fee was justified by the excess costs attributable to the rally). 
72. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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Palmore v. Sidoti shows that the problem arises outside the First 
Amendment. 73 The case involved a custody dispute. Mter the parent 
who had initially been awarded custody, a white woman, married an 
Mrican American man, the family court shifted custody to the white 
father, saying that the new custody arrangement was in the child's best 
interests: Being with a single father would be better for the child than 
being a white child in a mixed-race marriage, given the social condi-
tions of the United States. The posture of the case before the Su-
preme Court required the Court to accept the family court judge's 
assessment of the child's best interests. Conceding the possibility that 
changing custody from the mother to the father would be in the 
child's best interests, Chief Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous 
Court that the change in custody could not be justified by the social 
reality of persistent racism. The law, he wrote, could not even indi-
rectly "give ... effect" to private biases.74 Here the child suffers real 
harm (or so the Court assumed) in the service of a greater social 
good, the eradication of racism from even indirect effects on public 
decision-making. That, again, is a subsidy, and needs to be assessed as 
such. 
These cases show that the First Amendment and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, in at least some aspects that I believe to be uncon-
troversial, implicitly invoke comprehensive principles dealing with the 
distribution of wealth and other social goods and are not merely dis-
crete side-constraints on governance.75 Professor Eisgruber sees the 
"discrete rights" cases as he does because of his understanding of the 
institutional structure within which judges operate. The most impor-
tant aspect of that structure is that "the judiciary has limited options 
when it fashions relief. A court must issue an order that resolves the 
particular dispute in front of it. ... "76 The image upon which Profes-
73. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
74. Id. at 433. 
75. I acknowledge that the indirect argument I make could be rejected by agreeing 
that the courts are enforcing comprehensive principles in these cases and then arguing 
that the courts should take the same deferential stance with respect to them that they do 
with respect to social welfare rights. The cases raise problems near the heart of First 
Amendment and equality theory, however, and asserting that they are wrongly decided 
means rejecting a great deal of well-established law. 
76. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 173. The sentence continues, "and it can only pass 
upon the questions that have been litigated in that case." That constraint is so obviously 
contingent that it can play no substantial role in an argument against judicial enforcement 
of social welfare rights. People will litigate comprehensive claims, and present the ques-
tions relevant to the resolution of such claims, if courts tell litigants that they can do so. 
Professor Eisgruber might be concerned that litigants could not identify all the questions 
relevant to the resolution of the "web," id. at 165, of issues raised by comprehensive claims, 
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sor Eisgruber trades here is the award of damages for violations of 
constitutional rights and, more important for my purposes, the in-
junction that bars a government from invoking an unconstitutional 
rule to prohibit a person from taking some action, such as using a 
street for a demonstration. 
The "time, place, and manner" and cost justified fee examples 
show that the discrete mandatory injunction actually is more ambi-
tious than initially appears. The injunction against denying a permit 
for the demonstration embodies two judgments, not one. The first 
arises from the narrow structure of the particular litigation, and di-
rects the city to allow the demonstration-unless the city responds ap-
propriately to the second judgment. That judgment is contingent: It 
tells the city that it may deny the permit if it does so pursuant to a 
statute that provides reasonable access to the streets for demonstra-
tions. We can treat this second judgment as providing the city with an 
inducement to plan well for the use of its resources. 
Then, the question arises: Is it possible to structure the judicial 
remedies for violations of social welfare rights in a similarly contin-
gent way that induces planning? The answer, we now know, is "Maybe 
it can." Professor Eisgruber notes that other nations have adopted ju-
dicial review in the form of "a mechanism whereby political appoin-
tees with a more or less democratic pedigree are insulated against 
direct electoral control and authorized to limit legislative power on 
the basis of controversial interpretations of abstract moral and politi-
cal principles."77 Limitations on legislative power come in different 
forms, though. In particular, such limitations need not take the form 
of an injunction against a discrete practice. 
Consider the Grootboom decision of South Mrica's Constitutional 
Court.78 There a "group of people ... lived in appalling conditions, 
[and] decided to move out and illegally occupied someone else's 
land. They were evicted and left homeless."79 The government had 
designated the land they took over for subsidized low-cost housing. 
but that concern can be resolved by a careful fonnulation of the manner in which courts 
address comprehensive claims. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85. (Professor Eis-
gruber also observes that judges decide cases "between particular parties," and "not all 
interested persons will have standing to appear before the court." [d. Professor Eisgruber 
seems to know that this institutional feature. is not sufficient to support a strong distinction, 
noting the availability of procedural rules allowing other parties to intervene and to pre-
sen t amicus briefs). 
77. [d. at 75. 
78. See 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
79. [d. at 'll 3. 
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South Mrica's Constitutional Court held that the country's constitu-
tional guarantee of "access to adequate housing," and its imposition 
on the state of a duty to "take reasonable legislative and other mea-
sures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realiza-
tion of this right,"80 imposed a "minimum core obligation" to adopt a 
reasonable legislative program aimed at securing housing for all.8] In 
particular, the Constitutional Court evaluated the government's ex-
isting housing programs, using a standard of reasonableness, and held 
that the programs were not a reasonable method of implementing the 
constitutional guarantee because they did not have "a component ca-
tering for those in desperate need."82 The government could provide 
this component constructing housing for the desperately needy itself, 
or by subsidizing the construction of such housing by private entre-
preneurs, or by providing those in need with vouchers or other forms 
of "social assistance."83 Notably, however, the Court's decision did not 
require the government to provide any particular plaintiff with hous-
ing in short order.84 
Judicial review in the form of an order to plan is no panacea. 
There are obvious risks, in two directions: Plans may be created simply 
to satisfy the courts, with no real effort to implement them. The courts 
might take the plan at face value and dechtre victory, having had no 
effect on the actual implementation of social welfare rights.85 Alterna-
tively, courts may become frustrated with the pace at which the plans 
are implemented or with the content of the plans, and may intervene 
more aggressively, to the point where critics may fairly charge the 
courts with micromanagement.86 
80. CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, § 26 (1)-(2). 
8l. See 2000 (11) BCLR ~ 30. 
82. [d. at ~ 63. This element could involve providing temporary shelter pending the 
completion of more adequate permanent housing. In addition, the Court said, "[tlhe ab-
sence of this component may have been acceptable if the nationwide housing progamme 
would result in affordable housing for most people within a reasonably short time." [d. at ~ 
65. 
83. [d. at ~ 36. 
84. For a general treatment of approaches like that taken in Grootboom, see Michael C. 
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic },xperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 
(1998). 
85. The United States experience with school finance litigation contains some exam-
ples of this phenomenon. For a discussion that may underplay the extent to which interac-
tions between courts and legislatures led the courts to retreat without acknowledging the 
fact, see DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNI"IY (2001). 
86. The U.S. experience with prison reform litigation contains some examples of this 
phenomenon. For a discussion that may underplay the extent to which the courts came to 
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These risks do not mean that Grootboom-like judicial review ex-
ceeds the limits of judicial competence. The standard objection in lib-
eral constitutional theory to judicial enforcement of social welfare 
rights rests on the judgment that courts lack the ability to specify fully 
what distributive justice requires. As Professor Eisgruber puts it, the 
principles of distributive justice seem to require an evaluation of the 
"web" of social interactions as a whole, and not a moral judgment on 
what happens at any particular node.87 And, it would seem, courts 
could not possibly design an injunction that would effectively require 
the reconstruction of the web as a whole. 
That judgment is correct, but Grootboom-like review does not re-
quire that courts spell out the requirements of distributive justice in 
detail. Plans of the sort envisioned in Grootboom-like review will never 
directly or completely specify the requirements of distributive justice 
even with respect to a limited subject like housing, much less with 
respect to the distribution of social welfare generally. Rather, such 
plans might be ordered when it appears to a court that some "node" is 
particularly thin, as in Grootboom where the government's public hous-
ing programs had no component addressing the plight of a desper-
ately needy group. Further, a planning requirement is not inevitably 
final. A government might respond with a plan that simply reiterates 
its existing programs, supplemented with an explanation to the courts 
of why the judges' initial assessment of the programs' inadequacy-of 
the thin-ness of the "node"-was mistaken.88 In this way, a judicial 
requirement of planning is a strategic adaptation to the limits of judi-
cial competence. 
Professor Eisgruber gives strategic judgment an important place 
in his account of judicial review. In his view, courts have a comparative 
advantage over legislatures: 
micromanage prisons, see MALCOLM FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 
AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA's PRISONS (1998). 
87. See EISGRUBER, supra note I, at 165. 
88. Some admirers of the Canadian Charter of Right~ point to the role that the Char-
ter's first section might play in a dialogue of this sort between courts and legislatures. 
Section I says that the rights later enumerated can be limited when limitation "can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." CAN. CONST. ACT OF 1982, Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, § 1. A court might find a limitation not "demonstrably justified," 
and the legislature might respond by providing the demonstration that the court initially 
found lacking. For an example, see KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COIJRT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 185-86, arguing that a reenactment of invalidated to-
bacco advertising limitations "would have been more defensible if the government was 
prepared to reveal ... studies ... to show that absolute advertising bans were more effec-
tive than bans on lifestyle advertising. If the studies did not exist, the government could 
have commissioned them." 
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[W] hen it comes to the identification of moral principle, and if we 
want judges to give practical effect to that comparative advantage, 
then we must permit judges to make some strategic judgments as 
well-even if we believe that judges have no comparative advantage 
over other political institutions with regard to matters of strategy.89 
85 
Judges, Professor Eisgruber says, may "make incompetent strate-
gic choices," and he believes that "the strongest arguments for judicial 
restraint derive ... from the inability of judges to claim expertise with 
respect to the practicalities that predominate when moral principle is 
translated into legal policy."90 For standard constitutional liberals, 
those practicalities rule out the use of courts to implement the princi-
ples of distributive justice that constitutional social welfare rights 
migh t enact. 
One might distinguish between the strategic judgments that un-
derlie Grootboom-like review and those that underlie the cases Professor 
Eisgruber discusses, on the ground that the latter lead to what we 
might call overenforcement of the deeper moral judgments' the 
judges make, while the former lead to underenforcement of such 
judgments. For example, the moral judgment that justifies constitu-
tional limits on libel law might be this: 
[T] he government must not adopt any policy that denies people a 
reasonable opportunity to express their own ideas about what is 
true or good, or that fails to respect people's freedom to make 
their own judgments about which opinions and ideas are valuable 
ones.91 
But, Professor Eisgruber points out, the specific constitutional 
limits on state libel law go beyond the enforcement of that basic prin-
ciple, protecting more speech than the principle alone would protect. 
In contrast, the Grootboom-like requirement to plan obviously does not 
come close to enforcing whatever distributive justice requires with re-
spect to housing. 
The distinction between overenforcement and underenforce-
ment returns us to the observation that the cases of libel, the public 
forum, and Palmore v. Sidotz'92 show that courts do make decisions with 
implications for distributive justice. Overenforcing the moral right to 
free expression affects th~ distribution of the monetary value attached 
to reputation in a way that enforcing the basic moral judgment would 
not. Strategic judgments of the sort Professor Eisgruber endorses en-
89. EISGRUBER, supra note 1, at 139. 
90. [d. at 140. 
91. [d. at 137. 
92. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
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tail that the line Professor Eisgruber draws between discrete and com-
prehensive judgments is not as sharp as he would have it. Put another 
way, the strategic judgments that justify the courts' role in those cases 
demonstrate that courts do not categorically lack the capacity to make 
acceptable decisions about comprehensive principles. Grootboom-like 
review blurs the line between discrete and comprehensive principles 
further, by introducing the possibility of a form of judicial review in 
which the demands on the courts' ability to make strategic judgments 
are dramatically reduced. If courts are good enough to implement the 
moral principles embedded in libel law, they are good enough to im-
plement social welfare rights-once we understand that the range of 
possibilities for judicial review goes beyond the order of damages or 
the injunction directing a government official to act (or refrain from 
acting) with respect to a specific individual on a specific occasion.93 
Conclusion 
Readers will certainly have noticed the tension-or even contra-
diction-between the arguments developed in Parts I and II of this 
Review-Essay. In Part I, I argued that Professor Eisgruber endorsed too 
much judicial review because he overstated the differences between 
judges and elected officials with respect to their ability to articulate 
and act upon moral principle. In Part II, I argued that Professor Eis-
gruber endorsed too little judicial review because he drew a distinction 
between discrete and comprehensive moral principles that is untena-
ble once we understand that there are more forms of judicial review 
than the mandatory injunction and damage award. Both lines of argu-
ment could be right, in the following way: Grootboom-like review 
reduces the significance of disagreement over moral principles be-
tween judges and elected officials by allowing repeated interactions in 
which each set of officials learns from the other, and neither has the 
kind of priority that arises in strong-form judicial review (for judges) 
or in parliamentary supremacy (for elected officials).94 
93. In a more elaborate presentation I would develop the argument, the lines of 
which should be obvious, that even a court limited to awarding damage relief to a named 
individual plaintiff can sometimes implement comprehensive moral principles. 
94. The predominant metaphor in the "Commonwealth" model of judicial review is 
that of a dialogue between judges and elected officials. The leading discussion is Peter 
Hogg & Allison Bushell, The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn't a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 75 (1997). I think it quite 
difficult to construct a dialogic account of judicial review where the practice takes the form 
that Professor Eisgruber implicitly defends. 
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Professor Eisgruber's argument positions him between the alter-
natives described in Parts I and II, but, I believe, the location is intel-
lectually unstable.95 The allusion to Goldilocks is inescapable: 
Professor Eisgruber wants judicial review to be neither too cold nor 
too hot, but just right. There is a reason, though, that the Goldilocks 
story is included in collections of fairy tales. 
95. It is, of course, quite stable as a matter of social practice: Almost everyone engaged 
in the practice of judicial review, including judges and litigators, defends the form of judi-
cial review Professor Eisgruber defends. 
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